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This thesis developed a numeric index to evaluate the quality of decisions made
by Damage Control Assistants (DCAs) while managing simulated shipboard damage
control crises in support of the Total Ship Survivability (TSS) training doctrine. TSS
is a doctrinal shift away from simply saving a ship after it is damaged, to both saving
it and restoring its ability to fight. This doctrine imposes a new set of complex
requirements on DCAs. They must comprehend, integrate, and simultaneously manage
accurate, ambiguous, and frequently excessive levels of information. The Integrated
Damage Control Training Technology (IDCTT) program was designed to meet these new
requirements. The decision making proficiency index developed in this thesis was
designed to validate the IDCTT approach. Recommendations were made to validate the
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Damage control decision making is an art that requires a
Damage Control Assistant (DCA) to solicit, comprehend, and
manage accurate information, ambiguous information, and
excessive amounts information simultaneously. DCAs are
currently only given the training and instruction to deal with
unique and previously unknown situations at Damage Control
Assistant School. Their primary opportunity to demonstrate
their learned skills and to receive an evaluation of those
skills is during an intense inspection called Refresher
Training (REFTRA). Neither of these forums provide DCAs
individualized feedback which describes the impact of their
decisions on the overall performance of the ship while the
crew was combating damage.
Integrated Damage Control Training Technology (IDCTT) is
a research and development program which was stimulated by a
doctrinal change in damage control (DC) philosophy called
Total Ship Survivability (TSS). IDCTT is being designed to
improve a DCA's decision making proficiency by providing
specific, accurate, and immediate feedback during interactive
training sessions. This training will also help bridge the
gap between initial shore-based instruction and fleet
inspections
.
This thesis addresses a specific, but critical component
of the IDCTT program; that is, the development of a
quantitative measure of DCA decision making proficiency, a
measure called the Fuller Decision Index (FDI). This index is
unique because it focuses solely on the impact of the DCA's
decision, rather than upon the effectiveness of the DC
organization as a whole.
This introductory chapter discusses three key topics.
First, it introduces the newly adopted Surface Warfare
doctrine of Total Ship Survivability (TSS). This doctrine
creates an integrated shipboard training environment in which
DCAs must fuse information from different shipboard
organizations before they make their decisions, and is the
driving force behind both IDCTT and the FDI. Second, this
chapter provides a summary on the dynamics of the cognitive
aspects of decision making. Third, it summarizes five major
crisis management programs which address complex decision
making to provide a useful point of departure for the
development of the Fuller Decision Index (FDI).
A. TOTAL SHIP SURVIVABILITY (TSS)
Of the 192 U.S. Naval warships hit by bombs, gunfire or
kamikazes during WWII, 162 (or 84 percent) survived, with many
continuing to fight (TSSEIP, p.iii). Recent attacks on USS
STARK, USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS, USS PRINCETON and USS TRIPOLI
demonstrated that our ships, while survivable, only have a
limited ability to restore their war fighting capabilities.
As a result of ships' inability to mount a credible defense
after being damaged, U.S. Navy surface combatant damage
control training is being redirected. Doctrine is reverting
from a defensive philosophy; that is, detecting and countering
missile attack to avoid a hit and teaching the crew to simply
save a damaged ship if hit, back, to the World War II
philosophy of simultaneously continuing to fight while saving
the ship. This World War II philosophy is called "Total Ship
Survivability" (TSS) today.
The TSS concept, while not new, is considerably more
difficult to implement today because the complexity of modern
warships' systems has actually made them more vulnerable to
battle damage. Many of the fleet's "low mix" 1 ships were
affected by budgetary constraints, and many survivability
factors that are now being designed into newer platforms were
not incorporated. Nonetheless, the ability of a ship to fight
while damaged still depends on coordinated and rapid
identification, prioritization and restoration of the systems
necessary to fight the ship.
Ships will not have the ability to effectively fight while
damaged if training does not emphasize the integration of
command, combat systems, engineering and damage control.
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"Low mix" ships refers to the concept that certain classes
of ships like the Oliver Hazard Perry class Guided Missile Frigate
(FFG-7), would be less capable and less survivable but could be
procured in greater numbers because of lower acquisition costs.
Command personnel must have accurate information to determine
the extent of the damage and the crews' ability to restore
vital combat and engineering capabilities. Combat systems and
engineering personnel must be trained on new procedures that
enable them to reconfigure their systems, and continue to
fight and maneuver the ship after it has sustained damage.
Damage control personnel must know which systems clearly
support ship defense, and they must communicate more
accurately the location and extent of damage inflicted upon
the ship to the decision makers. Even the best damage control
organization will be overwhelmed if the ship is repeatedly
damaged
.
TSS is a concept that pulls together three separate
powerful organizations on a ship, engineering, combat
systems (CS) and damage control (DC). The Navy has, in
the last 50 years, been developing and refining equipment
and systems to support each leg of the ship's triad. The
focus has been on developing and fostering the technical
development of each organization, but little has been done
to bridge these three separate organizations.
Specifically we have built system operation doctrines for
each organization separately (engineering, CS and DC) and
encouraged and fostered an attitude onboard ship to have
the sailor only focus in on their own organization. This
is not all bad, but when a crisis occurs, an integrated
and coordinated solution may be the only way out. TSS
forces us to look at the three separate shipboard
organizations and in the examination expose their
weaknesses for supporting the total ship (McLean, 1992).
B. DYNAMICS OF DECISION MAKING
Given the high stress environment created by TSS and the
goals of IDCTT, it is necessary to understand the underlying
assumptions used to develop the FDI . One major assumption is
that high levels of stress will adversely affect the DCA's
ability to make sound decisions. To explore that supposition,
this section addresses decision making from two perspectives;
(1) the human operator functioning under normal conditions and
(2) the human operator functioning under stressful conditions.
Each subsection will discuss four cognitive concepts involved
in decision making: (a) the acquisition of information, (b)
the encoding and storage of information, (c) the processing
and retrieval of information and (d) the act of making a
decision.
1. DECISION MAKING UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS
Some hypothesized components of decision making
include (a) acquiring information, (b) encoding and storing
information (c) processing and retrieving information and (d)
making the decision. These specific components of decision
making are discussed to establish a normal or baseline
condition in which decisions are made. Understanding how
decisions are made under normal working conditions is a
prerequisite for understanding how decision making quality
degrades under stressful conditions.
a. ACQUIRING INFORMATION
Humans receive or gather information through their
senses. Sound decisions cannot be made if relevant
information is not acquired. For the purpose of this thesis
and IDCTT, damage control information is obtained through the
normal ship board channels available to the DCA and will be
discussed in further detail in subsequent chapters.
b. ENCODING and STORING INFORMATION
The ability to recognize or remember pertinent
information is another essential factor in decision making.
Before information can be recalled, it must first be placed
into memory and stored - encoded. Focused attention is
crucial to encoding. A memory code can only be created if one
pays attention to the desired information. Attention involves
focusing awareness on a narrowed range of stimuli or events
(Reed, p. 232).
Information flows through a series of three
separate memory stores: a sensory store, a short term store
and a long term store (Reed, p. 237). Sensory stores receive
information from the eyes (iconic memory) and ears (echoic
memory). Iconic memory lasts for about 100 milliseconds,
while echoic memory decays slower, taking more than a second
(Park, pp. 53-4). Information is retained by being
transmitted to short term memory (STM). Short term memory is
a limited capacity store that can maintain unrehearsed
information for about 20 to 30 seconds. It stores transitory
information temporarily and then almost immediately recalls it
to make operational decisions. In addition to having a time
constraint, STM also has a limit to the amount of information
it can hold, usually seven plus or minus two bits of
information (Reed, p. 240). The capacity of STM can be
increased by combining a group of familiar stimuli into a
larger unit or "chunk" (Reed, p. 240). It takes effort known
as "rehearsal" to transfer information from short term memory
to long term memory (LTM). Once in LTM information may be
retained for an indefinite period. LTM involves the
integration and recall of information acquired over longer
periods of experience, practice, and training. This is
typical of storage and recall of operational plans or
emergency procedures (Park, p. 57).
c. PROCESSING and RETRIEVING INFORMATION
All relevant information must be processed before
a sound conclusion can be formulated. Although not essential,
pattern recognition facilitates skilled performance because it
decreases the amount of unique information that must be
processed. Humans can readily adapt to changing and
unforeseen situations by improvising based on past experiences
or intuition. With practice, humans gain experience and
become more efficient at processing complex information and
associating it with recognized patterns (Park, pp. 49-50).
d. MAKING THE DECISION
A decision is made when a response is chosen to fit
a particular situation. Conceptually, the simplest decision
is one with only two potential responses like either a yes-no
or an on-off situation. For all decisions, there must be a
"compare" action that evaluates the possible ramifications of
choosing a particular course of action over another. When a
match is found between the input conditions and the criteria
for a response alternative, that response is selected and the
alternatives rejected (Fleishman, p. 330).
2. DECISION MAKING UNDER STRESS
Despite human ability to receive, encode, store,
process, retrieve, and use information, there are
environmental factors that can adversely affect decision
making. It is often difficult for DCAs to make decisions
because of the complexity of the situations they encounter,
and the sheer volume of information they must process. These
two factors will constitute the majority of the stress in
IDCTT. Stress is defined as:
A loading, a burden, a pressure on the individual, which
may come from physical or psychological sources. For
practical purposes, a stressor can be considered any
condition that taxes a person's resources or threatens his
well being (Conlon, p. 6).
The relationship between levels of stress and human
performance, in this case decision making, can be described by
the form of an inverted "U" as seen in Figure 1. This
function is called the Yerkes-Dodson Law. The premise of this
law is that increasing the amount of stress actually drives
performance efficiency up to its optimum level, after which,
additional stress degrades performance. Performance is
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assumed to be influenced by the extent to which the stressor
activates the central nervous system - arousal. The law also
states that both too much and too little stress adversely
impact performance, especially at the extreme regions of the
inverted "U" (Conlon, p. 8). An assumption of IDCTT is that
high levels of stress will adversely affect DCAs when they are
(a) acquiring information, (b) encoding and storing




















Figure 1 Yerkes-Dodson Law
a. ACQUIRING INFORMATION
The ability to acquire information may be reduced
by extreme attention narrowing. Attention narrowing refers to
a sharp constriction of a person's range of attention under
conditions of high central system activation; that is, during
states of high arousal (Conlon, p. 11). A person becomes
fixated on one item while failing to recognize other equally
or more important bits of information, to the detriment of the
situation at large.
b. ENCODING AND STORING INFORMATION
Short term memory is adversely affected by high
arousal stress. Information overload effectively blocks a
person's ability to encode information into short term memory
and rehearse and transfer information to long term memory
(Hockey, p. 291).
c. PROCESSING AND RETRIEVING INFORMATION
Processing information is not instantaneous. There
is a limit on the rate of information absorption and
retrieval, regardless of the clarity of the relationship
between the stimulus input and response output. The delay
between input and output is called processing or reaction
time. Processing time may increase if information overload
exceeds the decision maker's ability to process information.
This limit can be reached in three ways:
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First, much of the information available to an operator is
either irrelevant or redundant. A novice operator will
fail to recognize this and attempt to process more
information than necessary. This results in overload and
consequently low performance. Secondly, a task may be
inherently difficult or present information at an
excessive rate imposing speed stress or load stress.
Thirdly, overload may occur when two or more tasks compete
for an operator's attention and simultaneously present
information, thereby necessitating some form of time-
sharing (Park, p. 72).
d. MAKING THE DECISION
High workload induces activation. Activation is
the tendency of high arousal stress to rapidly instigate
action with little or no consideration for the consequences of
the action. Reaction times will be quicker, but more mistakes
will be made (Conlon, p. 13).
3. COPING WITH STRESS
One of the most difficult topics to quantify in
training is the amount of stress in an environment and its
effect on an individual's ability to make decisions. Stress
will be a part of IDCTT training to increase training
fidelity. It will be introduced by means of information
overload, high workload, noise, and inflexible time
constraints. Although stress will not specifically be used as
part of the evaluation in the FDI, it is an essential tool for
improving the DCA's ability to cope with stress and make
decisions
.
High levels of workload cause human errors. Human
errors can be defined as a failure on the part of the human to
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act) within specified limits of accuracy, sequence or time
(Park, p. 6). The ability to cope with stress will increase
the likelihood of making proper decisions and decrease the
likelihood of errors. Coping may be evaluated as a function
of the ratio between mental demands and capacity. The more an
individual's capacity exceeds the demands, the higher the
probability of efficient future coping efforts. Conversely,
the more the demands on an individual exceed the capacity to
cope with stress, the more likely that person will be less
able to withstand additional stress after a period of
experienced inefficiency.
Behavior in stressful situations is therefore directed
towards the regulation of the demand/capacity ratio. The
ratio can be improved (a) by raising an individual's capacity
(for example, by acquiring a new skill, increasing effort, or
improving training ) or (b) by lowering demands (for example,
by reducing uncertainty through information aids) (Hockey, p.
326). Training needs to be developed to help the decision
maker balance the demand/capacity ratio. The concept of Total
Ship Survivability has increased the demand on the DCA. The
concept of IDCTT evolved because the environment created by
TSS demands that either the DCAs become better decision
makers, or they fail.
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C. DECISION MAKING SUPPORT PROGRAMS
While there are few tasks that have requirements identical
to a DCA in a TSS environment, there are several programs that
are designed to train for and evaluate decision making during
critical situations. This section reviews five such programs:
(1) Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool, (2)
Telecommunication Emergency Decision Support System, (3)
Tactical Decision Making Under Stress, (4) Integrated
Survivability Management System, and (5) Operational
Sequencing System. This analysis focuses on each programs'
decision making assessment components and methodologies which
may provide insight into the development of the FDI
.
1. HEADQUARTERS EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT TOOL (HEAT)
HEAT is a set of consistent procedures which measure the
effectiveness of a military headquarters or command
center. HEAT supports quantitative, objective and
reproducible assessment of both the quality of the process
by which information is used by the commander and his
staff in decision making (and of the systems which support
the process), and the overall effectiveness of the
decisions made and their implementation (HEAT User's
Manual, 1985, p. 1-1).
HEAT views a headquarters as an adaptive control
system which, like a DCA, seeks to impact the environment by
means of the plans or orders it issues. (HEAT User's Manual,
1985, p. 1-1) The underlying principal of HEAT assumes that
if headguarters issue more effective orders, they require
little to no modification over time, while issuing inefficient
orders either requires constant revision or a countermand and
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re-issuance. HEAT uses a four step process to quantify and
therefore validate its theory of headquarters effectiveness.
First, HEAT attempts to quantify the output of a
headquarters by comparing the actual time each plan remains
unchanged against its expected unchanged time or life span to
yield a "plan length." Second, HEAT addresses the percentage
of the time the decision making process produces excellent,
adequate or inadequate plans. This approach accounts for the
fact that headquarters often operate under conditions of
uncertainty by measuring the frequency appropriate directions
are given (Hardee, 1985, p. 56). Third, HEAT considers the
information input necessary before a headquarters issues
orders by examining the process of command and control, which
was reduced to six basic functions:
Monitoring what is happening in the environment;
Understanding the characteristics of current or emerging
situations that have tactical or strategic significance;
Generating options;
Predicting the impact of each option on future
situations (sensitivity analysis);
Deciding which option or combination of options to take;
and
Directing the execution of those decisions (HEAT User's
Manual, 1985 p. 1-4)
.
Finally, HEAT considers communications that: (1)
inform superiors, subordinate and coordinate headquarters, (2)
query units about incomplete information, and (3) respond to
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queries from superiors, subordinates and coordinate
headquarters; all factors that effect headquarters' operations
(HEAT User's Manual, 1985 p. 1-5).
The communications required for command and control
in a headquarters are very similar to those of a DCA during a
damage control evolution. HEAT'S methodology provides
valuable insight for establishing objectives that examine the
use of information within an organization before a decision is
made. HEAT, however, is no longer used because its evaluation
paradigms were too rigid and too complex. HEAT analysis is
impossible unless the evaluator separates the functions of
operations planning and order issuance within the headquarters
being evaluated.
2. TELECOMMUNICATIONS EMERGENCY DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
(TEDSS) AND EXERCISE PROCESSOR FOR AN INTERACTIVE SIMULATION
OF A DECISION ENVIRONMENT (EPISODE)
TEDSS is a computer-based tool developed to support
the Office of the Manager, National Communications System, for
the management of national telecommunications resources in
times of national emergency. TEDSS training parallels another
area that is critical a DCA's job; resource management in
crisis situations. TEDSS provides managers the capability to
access, display, and utilize their resources, requirements,
and communications data to manage the restoration and
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reconstitution of communication assets (TEDSS version 7.0
Tutorial)
.
EPISODE, which is also computer-based, was developed
specifically to support TEDSS.
It is designed to provide the exercise control and player
communications simulation functions , and to provide for
non-intrusive data collection for post event analysis and
evaluation (EPISODE presentation, 1992 p. F-2).
While EPISODE is designed to provide individual and group
TEDSS user training, it can be adapted to evaluate any type of
system involving different communicating nodes like those in
the damage control organization (EPISODE presentation, 1992 p.
F-3) .
EPISODE uses four software programs: Manager, Node,
Central and Analysis. These programs coordinate through a
common system clock, executing independently to serve as an
exercise support tool with the abilities to develop realistic,
stressful, interactive training scenarios that records the
performance of a decision maker in real-time. EPISODE
attempts to record the unigue effects an individual's
decisions have on restoring communications systems during a
crisis. The statistics calculated by EPISODE to evaluate the
decision maker are the mean and standard deviations of five
parameters: (1) message creation time, (2), message send
time, (3), delay prior to transmission time (4), backlog time
and (5) respond time (EPISODE Users Guide, pp. 6-8).
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By only using five simple statistics to measure
performance, the TEDSS/EPISODE post-exercise evaluation
provides the user no real insight into the unique effect each
decision had on resource management or system restoration. A
lesson learned from reviewing TEDSS/EPISODE is that IDCTT must
clearly define decision maker behavioral requirements and
provide meaningful feedback and evaluation that will help
improve future performance.
3. TACTICAL DECISION MAKING UNDER STRESS (TADMUS)
Decision makers in modern warfare are faced with
situations characterized by rapidly unfolding events, multiple
plausible hypothesis, high levels of information ambiguity,
severe time pressure, and severe (often catastrophic)
consequences for errors. USS VINCENNES shooting down an
Iranian Airbus A300, Iran Air Flight 655 in 1988 was the
impetus for TADMUS. The Navy wanted a research program to
explore avenues that better prepare tactical decision makers
for the complexities of Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) . The resulting
program, TADMUS, which continues in its development, is
intended to aid decision making in situations that are
stressful, rather than to reduce the stress (TADMUS Program
Study, p. 1 )
.
The objective of the TADMUS program is to apply recent
developments in decision theory, individual and team
training, and information display to the problem of
enhancing tactical decision quality under conditions of
stress (TADMUS Program Study, p. 2).
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TADMUS developed concepts that were instrumental for
the development of the FDI. These concepts delineated
critical guidelines, which closely parallel the requirements
IDCTT, for thoroughly evaluating DCA performance during
realistic scenario-driven training. While IDCTT examines the
role of the DCA in support of TSS and TADMUS focuses
exclusively on combat systems team performance, the
programmatic similarities between TADMUS and IDCTT are clearly
articulated by the TADMUS program deqign. TADMUS concepts
developed a framework in which performance definition and
measurement are quantified by creating: (a) specific
definitions and measurement goals, (b) a scripted (AAW)
scenario and (c) the concept of quantified measures (TADMUS
Program Study, p. 1).
a. STATEMENTS OF DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENT GOALS
Defining and measuring performance required
methodology that reduced performance evaluation into its
fundamental components. The four components or actions
derived by TADMUS, (1) understand the decision, (2) establish
a laboratory test/delivery system, (3) develop Measures of
Effectiveness (MOEs), and (4) establish baseline decision
making performance are describe below.
(1) UNDERSTAND THE DECISION TASK
Analyze the AAW process to understand the
problems faced by AAW decision makers to help them (TADMUS
Program Study, p. 2).
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(2) ESTABLISH LABORATORY TEST/DELIVERY SYSTEM
Establish an operational test system that can
present the full scenario while recording all events in the
context of established Performance Standards, Measures of
Performance (MOPs) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for
future analysis (TADMUS Program Study, p. 2).
(3) DEVELOP MOEs
Develop MOEs that include both measures of
decision making processes (quality of reasoning, team
coordination etc.) and decision making outcomes (decision
accuracy, consequences, etc.) (TADMUS Program Study, p. 2).
(4) ESTABLISH BASELINE DECISION MAKING PERFORMANCE
Conduct experiments using Navy Combat
Information Center (CIC) teams to provide a baseline
performance against which later experiments and variations can
be contrasted. This will help establish how well a trained
CIC team is expected to perform in various types of scenarios
(TADMUS Program Study, p. 2).
b. AAW SCENARIO
The scenario is composed of background information,
mission assignment and a sequence of nine decision situations,
or vignettes. The sum of the nine vignettes constitutes a
game. Three major uncertainties occur in the vignettes:
Rules of Engagement interpretation, contact identification and
contact intent (TADMUS Program Study, p. 3). Unlike IDCTT
scenarios, the TADMUS vignettes were designed so that a
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decision in one vignette would not influence decisions in
later vignettes.
C. CONCEPT OF QUANTIFIED MEASURES
TADMUS uses a comparative method for guantifying
the decision maker's behavior. A baseline is determined by a
team of very experienced officers who assign
numerical relative importance in the context of the
tactical situation to the various decision opportunities
and further assign numerical relative values of the
tactical outcomes to the various possible decisions
themselves that can be taken at each opportunity.
Importance times value yields a tactical worth for each of
the various decisions, including assessments and act-
choices. This (comprehensive) list of worths provides
numerical scores for each decision made by the DM
(decision maker). The intent is not to establish what
decisions are "right", but what decisions are typical of
trained, experienced officers (TADMUS Program Study, p.
4).
The resulting Performance Standards describe
guantitatively what action should be taken by an experienced
CIC team under normal combat stress. MOPs describe
guantitatively what action actually was taken. MOEs relate
MOPs to Performance Standards, that is, effectiveness is shown
by contrasting actual performance to performance targeted
(TADMUS Program Study, p. 4).
d. SUMMARY
The TADMUS concept for guantifying CIC team
decision making performance is both logical and innovative.
These concepts are easily transferred to the tasks and
functions of a DC organization. Unlike IDCTT, TADMUS does not
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try to quantify the effect a single team member has on the
overall performance of the team. This artificiality designed
into TADMUS appears to be a flaw in training ideology because
of the assumption that critical decisions are made
democratically. Even though many situations in CIC are
command by negation, the commanding officer (CO), and in his
absence the Tactical Action Officer (TAO), have the ultimate
burden of making the key decisions. Individuals should
receive training that can record and evaluate their unique
impact on their team's performance.
4. INTEGRATED SURVIVABILITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (ISMS)
The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) is implementing
a comprehensive program in which all aspects of TSS are being
considered; that is, systems engineering, naval architecture,
command and control systems, ship's bills 2 , manning, and
training. Moreover, because of the complexities of TSS, the
role new technology can play in helping DCAs process the
stunning array of information to arrive at sound conclusions,
especially under conditions of extreme workload, is being
explored.
a. DAMAGE CONTROL MANAGEMENT
Damage control (DC) management consists of
acquiring, processing and displaying the necessary information
2 Ship's bills are documents that prescribe the jobs, billets
and responsibilities of the crew during specific evolutions.
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to support the command, control and communications of the
damage control battle organization while it is under casualty
conditions (The ISMS Ship Board..., p. 3). Damage control
decision making has always been difficult due to the volume of
information that must be processed. Information retrieval and
display depend on communications from a messenger or sound
powered phone talker and the use of grease pencils to position
casualty status symbols on laminated DC diagrams.
The delayed gathering and transmission of information
on the type and location of damage and the complexity of
coordinating repair party actions with other ship activities
created a need for more efficient and coordinated DC
management. A system that could display real-time DC
information would increase the efficiency with which a
casualty could be controlled. Even with this type of system,
managing a DC problem would still depend on the ability of
decision makers to translate available information into a
comprehensive picture, prioritize the casualties and order
actions that return the ship to the highest possible level of
readiness
.
b. ISMS PROGRAM DESIGN
In response to the growing need for more
coordinated damage control command, control and communications
(C3 ), NAVSEA is developing a computerized DC information
acguisition, processing, and display program called Integrated
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Survivability Management System (ISMS).
ISMS will provide correlated information, by means of
computer generated decision aids, to the battle
organization upon which to make real time decisions
concerning properly focusing damage control resources to
effectively engage and contain damage; present the same
decision making picture to all stations in the battle
organization; and enable battle organization decision
makers to issue orders and execute control actions (Combat
System Battle Damage..., p. ES-1).
The goal of ISMS is to significantly enhance the DC
process in several areas: (1) determining the type and
location of weapon effect, (2) communicating this information
to decision stations, (3) displaying the information, (4)
integrating the information with the ongoing activities, (5)
developing plans of action, (6) initiating commands, and (7)
executing the commands by merging traditional survivability
efforts with improved communications and computer support.
This accelerated process should minimize the spread of damage
while maximizing the remaining mission capability of the ship
(The ISMS Ship Board..., p. 1).
Displays envisioned for ISMS stations are:
(1) SUMMARY DAMAGE DISPLAY
The damage display includes the same
information given by damage control diagrams with all damage
plotted.
(2) SPECIFIC SYSTEM DAMAGE DISPLAY
The system would provide the ability to "zoom"
into specific systems showing schematics with the location of
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the components and equipment effected. It will reduce
"clutter" by layering details as part of the "zoom" feature,
while also providing, on demand, suggested reconfiguration for
specific damage.
(3) CONTROL
The system would display equipment status




It would present preplanned routes stored in
the database for rapid movement of personnel and material for
routine and damage conditions. Post damage route modification
will also be available.
(5) STABILITY
It would supply information for maneuvering,
predicted list and trim for various counterflooding options
and predicted effects of continued flooding on stability as
well as stability curves for actual loading and damaged
conditions (The ISMS Ship Board..., pp. 18-23).
ISMS and IDCTT deal with different aspects of
the same problem - improving the performance of the DCA.
IDCTT is being developed to enhance the ability of the DCA to
process all inputs and make better decisions, while ISMS is
being developed to improve the information being presented to
the DCA. The next and final program examined supports TSS by
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integrating and simplifying the presentation of vital ships
systems
.
5. OPERATIONAL SEQUENCING SYSTEM (OSS)
The first TSS exercise conducted on USS PRINCETON
exposed a major obstacle to the ability to fight while hurt.
There is discontinuity over departmental responsibility that
is exacerbated by documentation oversights for the chilled
water system, which keeps the U.S. Navy's most electronically
sophisticated warships operational. The criticality of this
situation was highlighted during the actual mine damage to
PRINCETON during the Persian Gulf War. PRINCETON was without
chilled water for an extended period of time after she hit a
mine. Chilled water is designated a vital system because of
its essential support of weapons, surveillance and
communication systems operations. The chilled water system
removes the heat generated by electronic eguipment. An
interruption to the chilled water supply, even for a few
minutes, may cause some systems to shut down from high
temperature or even fail (NWP 62-1 (Rev.C), pp. 1-11).
The chilled water system design on PRINCETON lacked
the flexibility to sustain and then guickly recover from
battle damage. It also lacked integrated documentation3 that
The responsibility for chilled water system is divided
between the supplier (engineering) and the user (combat systems)
during normal operations. The main deck is normally the demarkation
for each department's area of responsibility. The DCA is
responsible for all ship's piping systems and therefore responsible
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would support rapid reconfiguration. Individual valves were
designated differently in Engineering Operational Sequencing
System (EOSS), Combat Systems Operational Sequencing System
(CSOSS) 4 , and on the damage control plates 5 , with no means of
cross referencing valve labels. Also, some system changes
were not documented. These shortcomings made it extremely
difficult for engineering, combat systems and damage control
personnel to coordinate their restoration efforts.
The Operation Sequencing System (OSS) was developed as
a result of the difficulties the PRINCETON had restoring her
chilled water. It is designed to prevent future chilled water
restoration difficulties. OSS uses the standard DC plate
format by displaying the chilled water system within an
orthogonal view of the ship. Since the chilled water system
can be divided into several autonomous loops, OSS displays
them in separate colors. OSS also graphically presents
information on chilled water's supply, valves labels, piping
runs, loop cross connects, the systems that it supports, and
for coordinating the activities of the crew for restoring chilled
water piping during a casualty. All three activities have
different labeling systems for their respective area of
responsibility.
A EOSS and CSOSS provide exact procedures for aligning and
operating specific systems and pieces of equipment. They also
provide emergency or casualty procedures that are designed to save
lives and to protect the machinery and systems involved.
5 A diagram that shows the subdivisions of the ship and its
systems. There are specific plates to show each of the major
piping systems as well as plates showing only subdivisions.
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its return piping. The OSS diagram has a color coded valve
cross reference legend that allows the user to identify
specific valves using CSOSS, EOSS or damage control diagrams.
During normal operating conditions or in crisis
situations, OSS simplifies the manual process of identifying
alternate paths necessary for reconfiguration or restoration
of the chilled water system. Although the system diagram
provides the decision maker with more than enough information
to quickly isolate a casualty, OSS has also been computerized.
The OSS data base contains the same information presented on
the diagram, as well as the ability to analyze chilled water
alignment6 . The system can, on demand, prescribe specific
valves that need to be actuated to segregate specific chilled
water loops or related systems during both normal and casualty
situations. This vital reconfiguration information would
provide training before and facilitate quicker decision making
and quicker restoration of the chilled water system in the
event of a casualty (Budai, 1992).
OSS is not approved by the Navy and is not currently
implemented except as a concept. OSS is really an
improved DC plate, with the addition of software that can
be used as a training and familiarization aide for the
chilled water system. I think the DC chilled water plate
and others (high pressure air, firemain etc) can be
6 OSS has been programmed to accept valid valve alignment. If
an individual wants to close a valve to operating machinery without
providing a second source of chilled water, the computer prevents
the closure. It has been programmed to accept only proper
configurations of the system as prescribed by CSOSS and EOSS. It
also has the ability to be reconfigured during a casualty
situation.
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radically improved and integrated with selected CSOSS and
EOSS information and then inserted into the combat
systems, engineering and DC organizations to help
facilitate each organization working from the same frame
of reference when coordination is critical" (McLean,
1992) .
D . SUMMARY
Understanding the basic dynamics of decision making and
the daunting environment created by the need for TSS, makes it
clear that the task of training DCAs has become more
important, and more difficult. Although not inclusive, this
research derived seven key training and evaluation concepts
from the projects reviewed for IDCTT and specifically the FDI:
• Develop concise definitions for specific performance
standards, measures of performance (MOP) and measures of
effectiveness (MOE);
• Evaluate theories and models for determining how
training on information management could best support
the decision maker;
• Develop a better understanding of the specific role of
the DCA. It will improve training on systems
integration and personnel coordination during crisis
situations;
• Understand the criticality of defining training
objectives that will improve future decision making in
an operational environment;
• Develop realistic, stressful training scenarios;
• Ensure task-specific evaluation and feedback are linked
to the precise time an event occurred during a scenario;
and
• Adopt the concept that the evaluative process is not to
establish which decisions are "perfect", but which
decisions are typical of well trained personnel.
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II. TOOLS FOR DEVELOPING IDCTT
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) mandated that training be
conducted for personnel who,
because of their battle organization and
administrative duties, require additional ship
survivability and damage control training primarily in the
areas of battle and emergency preparation; battle and
emergency decision making; conflagration control;
assessment of residual capabilities after battle damage;
damage containment priorities; equipment and vital system
restoration priority setting in support of maintaining or
restoring warfighting capability after damage; vital
systems capabilities and reconfiguration decision making
to support essential ship, mission and damage control
capabilities. Level IV training is to be conducted both
ashore and on board ship through drills and exercises.
Level IV training includes instruction in conflagration,
threat weapons effects to the ship for areas of ship
deployment and the operation, management, reconfiguration
and administration of the battle organization as it
impacts ship survivability. This level of training will
also include instruction in inspection and battle damage
investigation procedures to be employed on shipboard vital
systems and in procedures to properly conduct shipboard
survivability drills/training (OPNAVINST 3541. ID, p. 3).
In support of IDCTT and in compliance with CNO mandated
training, this chapter examines (a) Interactive Courseware
(ICW); the media selected to deliver IDCTT, (b) the Computer
Aided Medical Information System (CAMIS); the format selected
to deliver IDCTT, (c) the Battle Damage Estimator (BDE); the
program that generates realistic weapon's effect data for
IDCTT and (d) basic damage control theory; the component that
provides structure for IDCTT.
29
A. INTERACTIVE COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
Dynamic interactive training is proving to be an effective
instructional method. It has the potential to satisfy the
training requirements mandated by both the CNO and TSS. A
readily available source for this type of training is
interactive courseware (ICW). ICW is a global term that
incorporates computer-based instruction (CBI), computer
managed instruction (CMI) and other interactive media. CBI
provides an interactive learning experience by providing a
stimulus that requires a user's response, and then provides
feedback to the user's input. CMI is the subsystem of ICW
that plans, administers, monitors, allocates instructional
resources, and provides reports on the student performance.
ICW can be used to teach facts, concepts, principles,
rules, procedures, and psychomotor skills (GE Aerospace, p.
2). It also allows practice of dangerous procedures without
the risk of injury of damage. Finally, when compared to
traditional instruction, ICW programs have been shown to
reduce student instructional time by about 30 percent,
increase student achievement by 0.40-0.50 standard deviation
units, and cost less than half as much (Fletcher, 1992 p. S-
2).
A sophisticated form of ICW instruction, interactive
videodisc (IVD), requires a student to participate actively in
a training environment that provides rapid, random access to
a large, inexpensively stored data base of video quality
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images and sequences. For the purpose of this thesis, IVD
will be referred to as ICW.
It is a videodisc system in which the videodisc player is
interfaced to an external computer. The videodisc player
acts as a computer peripheral with its functions under the
computer's control (Fletcher 1990, p. 1-5).
The 1989 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill
required the Department of Defense (DoD) to conduct a thorough
analysis of the use of ICW technology as it pertains to
effectiveness, cost effectiveness, time on task, retention,
and overall applicability to current and future DoD training
and education requirements. Forty-seven studies were
reviewed. A synopsis of the ICW technology findings follows.
ICW EFFECTIVENESS
• Used successfully to teach;
• More effective than conventional instruction
(classroom,military training and higher education);
• Equally effective for both knowledge and performance
outcomes;
• The more the interactive features of ICW technology were
used, the more effective the resulting training;
• Directed, tutorial approaches were more effective
than stand-alone simulation in ICW instruction;
• Resulted in less varied student performance;
ICW COST
• Less costly than conventional instruction;
ICW COST EFFECTIVENESS
• More cost effective than conventional instruction;
TIME ON TASK




• Seems unlikely to effect retention (suggesting the value
of ICW lies in improving efficiency not retention);
CONCLUSIONS
• ICW is more effective and less costly than conventional
instruction;
• ICW instruction can have a significant positive impact
on military training and education;
• More needs to be learned about how ICW instruction
should be designed and utilized; and
• ICW instruction should be routinely considered and used
in military training and education (Fletcher, 1990, pp.
S1-S5)
.
B. COMPUTER AIDED MEDICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM (CAMIS)
CAMIS is not a single program, but a series of ICW
productions that are used as interactive multimedia training
programs for the medical community (Omerod, 1992). Some of
the CAMIS productions are stressful, real-time scenarios that
test emergency and clinical procedures. The methodology used
for creating these training scenarios is being incorporated
into the development of IDCTT because of the parallel
functions of human physiology and ship design and similarities
between decisions made during triage and damage control
procedures. Both the doctor and the DCA have priority actions
that must be taken immediately if the "patient" is going to
survive. Supplemental actions may be taken after the
"patient's" condition has been stabilized. To make a correct
diagnosis and administer the proper treatment, the CAMIS user
must recognize the pertinent information from all the clues
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provided, no matter how subtle, and/or take actions necessary
to acquire additional information.
1. CAM IS METHODOLOGY
Like the procedure for determining the Performance
Standards for TADMUS, CAMIS productions use the performance of
experts as the baseline for evaluating students.
We describe each situation as a "problem space" with
several alternatives, death, partial recovery and full
recovery. We establish an original path to success when
the scenario is written. Next, the experts go through the
scenario to determine their actions or unique paths. The
results are tallied and analyzed. A pattern normally
evolves in which each expert performed a particular task
in the same order and at nearly the same time. This helps
determine items of priority that will later become
teaching points. In some cases an expert may have come up
with an improved technique or path to navigate through the
problem space that no one else considered. After all that
information has been compiled and the scenario reviewed,
the experts evaluate the frequency, order and time that
actions were taken. They make comments about the decision
points or nodes that created the successful path, and
amended it to include improvements. This process
validates an expert defined path to success (Allely,
1992) .
The technology used for CAMIS records every input from
the student for immediate feedback and subsequent evaluation.
The first and most obvious feedback or measure of a student's
performance is if the patient lives or dies. How the student
went about exiting the problem space is evaluated according to
the percentage of student decisions that concur with the
experts, the absolute time it took to navigate out of the
problem space and the time difference between the student and
expert. It is important to note that this process is not used
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to establish what decisions are "right," but what decisions
are typical of well trained personnel.
2. CAMIS VALIDATION
Numerous studies (Fletcher, 1990, pp. S1-S5) have
found that ICW improves the quality of training, and CAMIS is
no exception. The U.S. Naval Health Sciences Education and
Training Command validated three CAMIS programs developed for
the Operating Room Technician (ORT) School at the National
Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland: ORT Mediquiz--
Surgical Instrumentation , Principles of Aseptic Technique , and
Mock Surgery (Interactive Multimedia Courseware Validation
Report, p. i). The test scores of the 24 student validation
class were compared to the historical test scores of classes
not using CAMIS as part of their instruction. The findings of
the report are summarized below.
a. SURGICAL INSTRUMENTATION
Surgical instrumentation is taught in four
classrooms sessions. The first of the four sessions
introduces the general structure, types, and terminology of
instruments, their care and handling, and one group of
specific instruments. The other three sessions teach only
groups of instruments. The first lesson was taught using the
traditional lecture method because all of the material was not
present in ORT Mediquiz--Surgical Instrumentation. The
remaining lessons were taught using CAMIS either to support a
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classroom presentation or for individual study without lecture
(Interactive Multimedia Courseware Validation Report, p. i).
There are five tests on instrumentation. All
students received the same type of instruction before the
first test and the mean test score of the validation class was
equal to the historical mean score of other classes. For the
other four tests on material taught with CAMIS, the validation
class's mean test scores were 97 percent, 98 percent, 99
percent, and 98 percent with an overall mean of 98 percent.
Ninety-six percent of the class received grades of "A" . This
is a "substantial" 7 increase over the scores of the previous
classes who averaged mean scores of 95 percent, 95 percent, 96
percent, and 94 percent, with total mean score of 95 percent.
Only 76 percent of the previous classes received the grade of
7 The table shown below highlights the significance of these
results; as the mean score (in percentage) increased in the
validation class, the variability associated with these scores
decreased. These systematic trends point to the enhanced learning
effect attributable to the interactive media format.







I 56 92 4.88 91 5.33
II 50 97 4.86 95 4.75
III 75 98 1.75 95 6.10
IV 100 99 1.15 96 5.60
FINAL 100 98 1.86 94 6.11
Source: Interactive Multimedia Courseware Validation Report
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"A" (Interactive Multimedia Courseware Validation Report, p.
ii).
Data based on surveys and interviews with the
students and instructors revealed that:
• Videodisc images of the instruments were preferred over
slides;
• CAMIS was effective when used for self-study, freeing
instructor time for other training matters; and
• With fewer low scores on the tests, remediation and
other follow-up tasks could be reduced (Interactive
Multimedia Courseware Validation Report, p. ii).
b. PRINCIPLES OF ASEPTIC TECHNIQUE
Aseptic technique primarily deals with preparing a
sterilized environment for the operating room, its equipment,
and personnel before an operation. The Aseptic Technique ICW
instruction was presented to the validation students in a
classroom by an instructor, after which the students
immediately used the exercise portion of the courseware. At
their leisure, they used the ICW for review and test
preparation during the week before the exam (Interactive
Multimedia Courseware Validation Report, p. ii).
The students were tested using the ICW test on a
random selection of 25 still and motion video items from a 48
item pool. Forty-two percent of the class achieved a perfect
score and 92 percent achieved a score of 92 percent or higher.
Instructors considered the ICW testing strategy superior to
the previous strategy because it required the student to
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visually identify breaks in aseptic technique instead of
writing out each of the principles verbatim. The ICW format
is especially desirable because one of the primary purposes of
the Aseptic Technique instruction is to prepare the students
for the live Mock Surgery test (Interactive Multimedia
Courseware Validation Report, p. iii).
C. MOCK SURGERY
The student survey indicated that each validation
student used the ICW an average of seven times, for an average
total duration of 7.5 hours before the test. The Mock Surgery
test requires a student to perform the role of either a scrub
or circulator8 during a simulated surgical procedure. The ICW
developed for mock surgery included a 45 minute simulation of
an appendectomy; a five minute bonus round exercise simulating
the use of instruments in a surgical setting, and if
necessary, instructor access into the simulated events for
instruction and remediation purposes (Interactive Multimedia
Courseware Validation Report, p. 26).
The comparison class, which had no exposure to the
Mock Surgery ICW, had an overall passing rate of 52 percent.
The class that was informally exposed to the draft ICW during
a "Beta Test" (not in formal instructional settings) had an
overall passing rate of 79 percent. The validation class,
8 Scrubs ensure the sterility of individuals entering the
operating room and circulators ensure the sterility of the
equipment used in the operating room.
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which used the ICW formally in its instruction, had a passing
rate of 98 percent (Interactive Multimedia Courseware
Validation Report, p. iv)
.
3 . SUMMARY
The validation report makes a strong argument in favor
of using ICW during formal instruction as well as allowing the
students access to it for individual study. ICW decreased
instruction time while improving the students' ability to
understand information and apply it as knowledge to specific
skills. The enthusiasm of IDCTT's developers for the CAMIS
format stems from the conceptual parallels between damage
control and certain medical procedures. Even the three
productions developed for ORT, ORT Mediquiz--Surgical
Instrumentation, Principles of Aseptic Technique, and Mock
Surgery can be described in damage control terminology; that
is, basic damage control knowledge, damage control material
readiness, and damage control situation management. The CAMIS
techniques, methodology, and technology provide a solid
vehicle for IDCTT's implementation and a key for FDI
development
.
C. THE BATTLE DAMAGE ESTIMATOR (BDE)
1. BDE METHOD
The CAMIS format for delivering IDCTT will not be able
to completely satisfy TSS requirements if the data being
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presented do not mirror reality. The BDE is the cornerstone
of coordinated IDCTT training because it is able to provide
accurate ship damage data that can be used to support the
development of meaningful and realistic integrated training
scenarios. The BDE is a personal computer-based software
program that is able to show the damage caused by weapon
effects such as fire, flooding, "frag", shock, blast, and hull
whipping. The software is able to provide information on the
impact of these weapons on the ship's structure, equipment,
systems, and personnel. (Budai, 1992 and McLean, 1992).
The BDE mathematically models the effect of various
non-nuclear weapons on surface ships. Damage is calculated to
determine the probable degradation of or effects on a ship's
seaworthiness, engineering systems, and combat systems.
System out-of-action probabilities are obtained by using a
Monte Carlo procedure.
As an example, suppose a 5 hit attack is being evaluated,
5 random hit points (conforming to the specified hit
distribution, aim point, etc.) are selected and the
components inactivated are cumulatively determined after
each hit. This procedure is repeated, using a new set of
5 random hit points each time, until a statistically
significant number of trials have been evaluated. Out-of-
action probabilities are then determined for each system
as the ratio of the number of trials in which the system
was inactivated to the total number of trials.
Vulnerability evaluations can be made for both underwater
and air trajectory weapon attacks, but each weapon type
and attack direction must be considered separately.
Warheads may be contact, delay or proximity fuzed. The
computer program can also handle forward facing shaped
charge warheads. The approach trajectory for air
delivered weapons may be at any elevation angle and at any
azimuth. Once the elevation angle is selected, only the
azimuth may be varied within the Monte Carlo simulation.
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The approach trajectory for underwater weapons must be
parallel to and below the waterline. (TSSEIP, p. 3-14)
The target ship is described two ways; in terms of the
geometric configurations of the decks, bulkheads, outer hull,
and in terms of vital components which are organized into
major systems. The configuration is defined by deck and
compartment locations. Vital components, such as turbines,
generators, and pumps are described in terms of bounding
coordinates and shape. Major systems are defined as series
and/or parallel combinations of subsystems and vital
components (TSSEIP, p. 3-14).
Damage to compartments and vital components is
calculated through a set of damage algorithms that evaluate
the effect of air bursts, underwater bursts, and internal
explosions. After each hit, the BDE calculations account for
compartments breached by blast, compartments flooded, as well
as the inactivated vital components, and major and minor
systems. The data on damage are used to determine overall
personnel and system kill probabilities.
2. BDE APPLICATION
The TSS concept was first given a limited test onboard
USS PRINCETON9 during her Refresher Training (REFTRA) 10 in
9 Ironically, this first TSS drill simulated damage that was
the exact casualty experienced by PRINCETON during the Persian
Gulf War.
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March 1990. A simple tactical scenario culminating with BDE
predicted damage was conducted during her Major Conflagration
Drill (Mass Conflag) 11 . Lessons learned from this exercise
were utilized in planning for a full test of the TSS concept
on USS ARKANSAS in April 1990. Detailed preparation for the
test on USS ARKANSAS included 27 runs of the BDE to provide a
range of possible hits. Review of the Ship's Damage Control
Plates and ship checks of actual equipment locations confirmed
the probable accuracy of projected damage (TSSEIP, p. iv)
.
By November 1990 , Fleet Training Group, San Diego had
conducted five TSS exercises and concluded that the BDE
. . . provides a logical estimation of probable damage
based upon engineering design factors. It provides likely
and logical scenarios with which ships' crews can practice
and test their knowledge of systems and skills in
restoration (COMFLETRAGRU San Diego, CA Naval Message
071545Z Dec 90, Subject: Total Ship Survivability (TSS)
SITREP)
.
Currently, Afloat Training Organizations (ATOs), which
were formerly the Fleet Training Groups (FTGs), conduct TSS
training during REFTRA. The BDE based scenarios, like those
used on PRINCETON, ARKANSAS and in subsequent REFTRAs,
highlighted several aspects of a ship's procedures,
10 The Afloat Training Organization, formally the Fleet
Training Group is responsible for training and evaluating ships in
all of their warfare areas. Each ship is scheduled for this
training and evaluation approximately once every 18 months. This
training and evaluation period is called refresher training
(REFTRA)
.
11 A drill in which the crew has to combat two or more
catastrophic casualties. e.g., A missile and a mine hit.
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instructions, and training that failed to fully support the
TSS concept. The TSS exercises exposed a lack of an effective
method to display the status of the ship to the Commanding
Officer, at his battle station in the Combat Information
Center or even during normal operating conditions
(COMFLETRAGRU San Diego, CA Naval Message 071545Z Dec 90,
Subject: Total Ship Survivability (TSS) SITREP).
Internally-produced instructions and bills like the
combat systems doctrine, battle orders, restricted maneuvering
doctrine, and the Commanding Officer's standing orders 12 and
fleet generated instructions such as Engineering Operational
Sequencing System (EOSS) and Combat Systems Operational
Sequencing System (CSOSS) did not mutually support the ships
tactical requirements. An example of contradictory doctrine
occurred when engineering watchstanders, using EOSS, stripped
a switchboard by removing its electrical load in response to
a generator fire while combat systems watchstanders were
tracking an inbound air raid. The engineering action resulted
in a loss of power to combat systems equipment, which
precluded defending against the inbound raid. (COMFLETRAGRU
San Diego, CA Naval Message 222220Z Aug 90, Subject: Total
Ship Survivability (TSS) SITREP). Stripping a switchboard
affected by fire is mandated engineering practice during
normal conditions. TSS demonstrated the need for an
12 These instructions provide the crew with specific duties and
responsibilities during special evolutions.
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integrated prioritization of the ship's functions to avoid the
possibility of one department's actions obviating the function
of another during periods of crisis.
There were four additional shortcomings associated
with internally-generated instructions. They were:
• The configuration of ship's systems during specified
conditions of readiness were not standardized,
preventing flexible responses to casualties.
( COMFLETRAGRU San Diego, CA Naval Message 111630Z Mar
91, Subject: Total Ship Survivability (TSS) SITREP);
• Many ships failed to prescribed policies or delineated
equipment restoration priorities necessary for system
reconfiguration in the event the ship received damage.
(COMFLETRAGRU San Diego, CA Naval Message 222220 Aug 90,
Subject: Total Ship Survivability (TSS) SITREP);
• There was no procedural contingency plan to establish or
maintain an alternative source of communications between
damage control and engineering personnel with command
and combat systems personnel. Not having a secondary or
tertiary means of establishing internal communications
prevented timely command and control and hampered the
restoration of vital equipment during TSS drills
(COMFLETRAGRU San Diego, CA Naval Message 111630Z Mar
91, Subject: Total Ship Survivability (TSS) SITREP); and
• The lack of training on the interplay of combat and
engineering systems, combined with the weak damage
control abilities of combat system personnel, delayed
the restoration of weapon systems.
After exposing a ship's weaknesses, the ATO provides
guidance from lessons learned that help streamline the
internal information coordination necessary to make decisions
that satisfy TSS. TSS training has already demonstrated
improvements in (1) ship post-hit fighting capability, (2)
crew confidence, and (3) applications for future system
designs (TSSEIP, p. iv).
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The ATO's TSS training is generally considered top
quality training, but current ATO availability constraints
afford a ship this expert attention only once every 18 months.
Steps need to be taken to provide training that would maintain
ship's proficiency throughout its 18 month cycle13 . Three
things are needed to make the training more available. First,
fleet training organizations need to train shipboard personnel
as "in-house" experts who can develop and implement realistic
TSS training. Second, local interim training for these key
decision makers is needed to maintain their peak proficiency.
Third, and the area of focus for this thesis, the decision
making of these key personnel in the TSS environment
(specifically the DCA) can be evaluated and enhanced by
applying new training technology to BDE based IDCTT scenarios.
D. DAMAGE CONTROL COMPONENTS
The environment, delivery system, and source of accurate
damage information have been identified for IDCTT. This
section addresses the essence of IDCTT by defining (1) damage
control objectives, (2) damage control tasks and (3) damage
control measures of performance.
13 Surface ships have 18 month deployment cycles where they
spends 12 months preparing for each six month deployment. During
the preparation phase, a ship is continually involved in training
and evaluation on its warfare areas.
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1. DAMAGE CONTROL OBJECTIVES
This section will define the three objectives of
damage control as the logical first step in developing DCA
MOPs.
a. PREVENTION
The purpose of prevention is to take all
practicable preliminary measures to maintain ship's watertight
and fumetight integrity, maintain reserve buoyancy and
stability, remove fire hazards and upkeep, and distribute
emergency equipment before damage occurs (NSTM chap 079 vol 2,
p. A-7).
b. MINIMIZATION
Damage control attempts to minimize and localize
damage by taking measures to control flooding, preserve
stability and buoyancy, combating fires and administer first
aid treatment to personnel (NSTM chap 079 vol 2, p. A-7).
C. RESTORATION
The goal of restoration is to, as quickly as
possible, conduct emergency repairs after being damaged. Some
actions that help restore a ship include supplying casualty
power to vital systems, regaining a safe margin of stability
and buoyancy, replacing essential structures, and by manning
essential equipment (NSTM chap 079 vol 2, p. A-7).
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2. DAMAGE CONTROL TASKS
There are seven general DC tasks that satisfy the DC
objectives of which six are applicable to IDCTT. Successfully
performing these tasks constitutes a minimum level of
performance. These tasks entail:
Preserving stability and watertight integrity
(buoyancy)
,
Preserving fume and airtight integrity,
Maintaining the operational capability of vital systems,
Preventing, isolating, fighting, extinguishing, and
removing the effects of fire and explosion,
Preventing personnel casualties and facilitating care
of the wounded, and
Making rapid repairs to structure and eguipment
(Information flow and Decision-Making in the DC
Organization for DDG-51 Class ships, 1989, p. 2).
3. DAMAGE CONTROL MOPs
The Navy Personnel Research and Development Center
(NPRDC) is one of the principal organizations responsible for
the development of IDCTT. Part of their tasking required them
to clarify the relationship between MOEs and MOPs for IDCTT.
The old MOE for a ship in combat during WWII would have
been to get the ship up and running after damage. The new
philosophy again looks at the response times of the new
weapons systems and asks how fast can the ship be back up
and fighting (after damage is sustained) . The MOPs should
have a positive effect on the MOE. The better the scores
of the MOPs the less time it should take to restore the
ship's systems (Robinson, 1992).
NPRDC, with the help of this research, then determined
the general criterion for determining DCA performance. These
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DCA skills were targeted to be improved through training
conducted in a BDE-based interactive multimedia scenario. As
with CAMIS, the scenario (problem space) has paths to save the
ship, paths that allow the ship to fight even though it will
eventually be lost and paths that guickly destroy the ship.
Since each individual enters training with a different
level of competency, NPRDC envisions the creation of scenarios
that have several levels of difficulty (1-10) to appropriately
challenge the abilities of the trainee. A level 1 scenario,
which may represent only one hit, would be relatively mild,
while higher level scenarios would grow in severity and
complexity. In all cases however, there are specific tasks
that the DCA must perform, each being initiated at a decision
node. At each of these decision nodes, the DCA can be
evaluated using the following generic NPRDC MOPs
:
1. Recognition of the problem(s)
2. Retrieval of necessary information
3. Interpretation of information/data from several sources
(recall how new information will be interpreted - new
information will be compared to old information for
corroboration) data options:
a. Act on data,
b. Ignore data,
c. Call for more data,
4. Decisions:
a. Levels of correctness:
(1). Right actions (ideal path/shortest time),
(2). Common mistakes,
(3). Wrong actions,
b. Condition of the decision maker:
(1). Normal conditions,
(2). Conditions of stress,
5. Communication of problem to other parties (Robinson,
1992),
6. Timeliness of decisions, and
7. Awareness and management of the total situation.
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The seven areas addressed by NPRDC ' s MOPs focus on the
cognitive processes leading up to a decision and the
associated decision. This concept was critical to the
development of the FDI because the MOPs determined the essence
of what the FDI was designed to capture. Decision making is
the most critical responsibility of a DCA managing a damage
control problem and the most difficult to teach. The NPRDC
MOPs provide the formula for reducing DCA decision making down
to its core components. Evaluating the individual components
facilitates easier identification of decision making failure
points and re-training those specific weaknesses.
E. SUMMARY
CNO mandates level IV ship survivability management
training to prepare ships' decision makers for the complex
environment of TSS. The procedures the DCAs are expected to
follow, the equipment and the skills required, and the
conditions of the job provide sufficient task-descriptive data
to allow the design and implementation of a program that
satisfies this CNO requirement.
IDCTT's design and objectives should establish an
acceptable level of job performance. Performance standards
for specific tasks serve as a baseline for designing training
and can serve as an indication of performance enhancement as
a function of that training (Fleishman, p. 8). IDCTT's
objective is to develop an interactive system that will train
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DCA's to make correct decisions during mass conflagration and
TSS situations (McLean, 1992). IDCTT is a research and
development program under the auspices of the Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA) . The Navy Personnel Research and
Development Center (NPRDC), the Center for Interactive Media
(CIM) in Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of the
Health Sciences, Systems Integration & Research Inc. (SIR) and
the present thesis are all part of a programmatically
integrated IDCTT effort.
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III. IDCTT PROGRAM COMPONENTS
The previous chapters reviewed the concepts, programs, and
methodologies that will be incorporated into IDCTT generally
and the FDI specifically. This chapter dissects the unique
components of IDCTT by (a) reviewing the pilot TSS scenario,
(b) explaining the basic computer programming principles
associated with the decision making logic, and (c) describing
the development of the program's measure of decision making
proficiency - the Fuller Decision Index.
A. IDCTT SCENARIO
. . . IDCTT is developing a BDE-based TSS scenario for an
ICW damage control central trainer in which a DCA is moved
from situation to situation based on the quality of his
decisions. Scenarios will be created to challenge the
DCA's ability to manage a catastrophic DC problem. IDCTT
training will be designed to foster integrated TSS
analysis, which necessitates the use of the higher level
cognitive skills of synthesis, evaluation, and application
among others. The ICW presentation will also introduce
stress components such as noise, failure, confusion, time
limitations and high volumes of situational data (Ulozas,
1992) .
1. SCENARIO BACKGROUND
The IDCTT scenario design emphasizes important damage
control fundamentals that will be referred to as damage
control "teaching points." IDCTT interactive video training
will require the DCA to evaluate and re-evaluate
simultaneously occurring, dynamic situations to determine the
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best course of action. As the scenario progresses, the number
and complexity of the situations the DCA faces will increase
the level of workload and the difficulty of making sound or
intelligent decisions.
This is accomplished by controlled damage hits, each
necessitating different damage control actions on the
DCA, with the ramifications of non-action or
inappropriate action being highly penalizing to the
ultimate demise of the ship (Draft, November 9,
1992) 14 .
As of January 15, 1993, the first BDE-based TSS
scenario is cycling through a review of its first draft. This
draft establishes the complete overall scenario and
Damage/Actions, tailored specifically to the USS JOHN PAUL
JONES (DDG-53). The following criteria are being used in the
development of the Scenario:
• A total scenario real time period of 20-25 minutes is
considered the maximum for this initial demonstration
model;
• The first model to be produced is principally meant to
demonstrate, though as completely as possible, the
concept of the training tool, rather than be an attempt
at the final training product;
• As many "Teaching Points" as possible have been
included, with sufficient viability, within time and
complexity constraints. Certain DC actions, and
expected damage, have intentionally been excluded due to
time constraints;
14
"Draft" refers to the DCA Interactive Training Model
Development Package - Draft I as written by SIR. "Review Draft"
refers to the second iteration, which is the first revised draft of
the same package. The members of the implementation planning group




• It is emphasized that this Model is intended to train
the DCA, not the DC organization at large; and
• The format has been structured to allow for easy
development of each event as detailed definition




The USS JOHN PAUL JONES (DDG-53) will be steaming in
the Persian Gulf when she receives indications of hostile
aircraft in the area. The ship is also in a known mine threat
area. The Commanding Officer orders General Quarters (GQ) 15 .
The DCA is in his stateroom when GQ is sounded. While
enroute to Damage Control Central, the DCA will be exposed to
pre-damage situations. A mine explodes on the aft starboard
side of the ship beneath the waterline at frame 400. Enemy
aircraft launch an Exocet type missile which impacts the ship
at frame 200 on the port side superstructure and explodes.
Personnel, system, and structural casualties are investigated
and reported.
Principally, the mine hit causes a fire, equipment
damage in the aft generator room, and floods two aft
storerooms. The missile hit causes fire, personnel, and
equipment damage. The DCA has to coordinate the damage
control actions of the repair parties.
15 General Quarters is the highest state of readiness of a




The firemain 16 and chilled water systems are ruptured
in both hits, requiring isolation and restoration decisions.
Personnel routing, equipment deficiencies, stability concerns,
out of control situations, and other incidents add complexity
to the Scenario.
The Scenario concludes successfully if the DCA makes
reasonable decisions appropriate to the damage incurred by the
ship. A successful path includes both minor and major
"mistakes" or DCA decisions/action pit-falls which would
affect the outcome.
In keeping with the TSS concept and since the ship is
clearly targeted and vulnerable to subsequent attacks, the
over-riding concern of the command will be the amount of
degradation to and the restoration of the Combat Systems
(Review Draft)
.
B. IDCTT PROGRAM LOGIC
Although the IDCTT scenario authors are painstakingly
establishing a realistic expert path through the scenario, the
complexity of the scenario and the almost limitless
permutations associated with the DCA's actions or inactions
make it nearly impossible to script every conceivable real-
time situation. This is partly because the scenario is
16 Seawater is provided to the ship in the firemain system.
This seawater is the ship's primary firefighting agent as well as
a medium used to cool equipment and auxiliary machinery (NWP 62-1
(Rev. C) p. 1-10)
.
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written using a linear concept, where actions take place
sequentially. The difficulties of accurately tracking the
multitude of simultaneously occurring system reactions to
independently initiated catastrophic events, like a mine or
missile hit, are alleviated by the BDE . The evaluation
problem arises when trying to track the status of the ship's
systems as they respond to the DCA's actions or inactions.
CAMIS programmers working on the medical triage problem
circumvented this problem by using the computer to track the
status of all bodily systems at once. The computer also
records every user input. A matrix with a predetermined set
of systems' conditions allows continuous tracking of each
system and the cumulative status of the patient. The "matrix
logic" "knows" which supporting systems or sub-system
components need to be fully operational for system "x" (say
for IDCTT, the firemain) to be at 100 percent. The matrix
logic will be programmed to understand the ship's
"physiological" or functional reactions to system "x" being
degraded based on the BDE's fire spread algorithms, system's
deactivation diagrams, and the "teaching points." Given the
ramifications of system "x's" degradation, restoration becomes
a stressful and time critical situation that decision makers
must manage (Allely, 1993).
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C. IDCTT EVALUATION: THE FULLER DECISION INDEX
IDCTT is being developed to improve the decisions made by
DCAs operating in a TSS environment by incorporating the CAMIS
format of interactive courseware, information from the Battle
Damage Estimator, and damage control objectives, tasks, and
measures of performance. IDCTT is also establishing a
taxonomy of human task performance that provides the
foundation for a new evaluation technique - The Fuller
Decision Index (FDI).
The FDI, the product of this thesis, is a decision making
quality measurement system that was developed with the goal of
objectively and statistically deriving expert performance
standards for IDCTT. The first objective performance
standards derived by the FDI will be obtained using the
decision making performance of a sampling of damage control
experts participating in the pilot IDCTT technology
demonstrations. This expert level of performance will be the
standard that IDCTT will use to train DCAs. FDI evaluation
will compare individual DCA performance to the mean number of
decisions made in the scenario, mean information, decision
quality, and scores, and the mean time it took the experts to
successfully complete the scenario.
By using interactive trainers to compare the preferred
decisions of the experts to the students, and evaluating
why what the student did was not as good, we can teach the
proper thought process for DCAs. IDCTT will stress the
fundamentals while also teaching DCAs to anticipate future
situations without being subjected to simple static
numeric tests to gauge their knowledge (Miller, 1992).
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The FDI is an evaluation tool that quantifies decision
making quality by examining both the information known before
a decision is made and the results of that decision. One
reason the research for and development of the product of this
thesis, the FDI, is unique is that this index is being created
in concert with another program's development - IDCTT. This
thesis, a front-end or formative analysis, focuses on
quantifying the expected added training value of using IDCTT
to improve the decision making of DCAs by examining decision
theory, other scenario driven decision making programs, and
the benefits of using ICW.
1. FDI DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGY
The most important guideline used for developing the
FDI was the goal that the system should only measure the DCA's
performance as a function of the impact each decision has on
the ship's overall status 17 . Reviewing theories of information
processing and decision making was a critical step in creating
a tool that quantifies the results of the decision making
process, especially under conditions of high arousal or
workload. The design of the FDI was also derived by examining
the strengths and weaknesses of the other programs reviewed in
this report. The FDI was created to meet the following
objectives
:
17 Many of the concepts used in creating the FDI draw on
techniques described by Capt . Jim Miller, USN Ret. during an
interview December 10, 1992.
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• Only evaluate decisions as they relate to the scenario's
specific teaching points. This keeps tight focus on the
question, "What are we trying to teach?"
• Evaluate the pre-hit and post-hit activities separately
even though some pre-hit items may impact post-hit
performance
.
• Determine relative priorities for teaching points. This
hierarchy should be adhered to for any given array of
simultaneously occurring events.
• Establish an "expert decision path." This path will be
used as a benchmark when determining expert performance.
Expert performance will then be the standard by which a
DCA will be evaluated.
• Establish plausible alternate paths (matrix logic).
• Evaluate the "goodness" of each decision by dividing
decision making into two parts - information used and
actual decision results. This method supports the
underlying, applicable MOPs (problem recognition,
information retrieval, interpretation of data, decision
path, communications, timeliness and overall situational
awareness )
.
• Quantify the components of the two parts of decision
making. Ensure all possible conditions of information
and decision outcome are accounted for.
Keeping these objectives in mind, the Fuller Decision
Index (FDI) is a model that uses (a) damage control teaching
points and (b) decision evaluation variables to measure the
DCA's ability to translate IDCTT scenario information into a
comprehensive picture, prioritize the casualties and make




The use of specific IDCTT teaching points and matrix
logic make it possible for the FDI to measure the impact the
DCA has on the ship's ability to prepare for and recover from
damage. The IDCTT scenario is divided into two distinct
phases, (1) a pre-hit phase and (2) a post hit phase, which
encompasses all situations that arise after the first weapon
impacts the ship, including other hits on the ship.
a . PRE-HIT
The actions required of the DCA in the first
section of the IDCTT scenario are less dynamic than those
required for the chaotic post-hit phase because there is less
information uncertainty and the events present themselves in
a naturally occurring order. The priorities given to specific
events by the FDI delineate the relative importance of each
event. The pre-hit teaching points, given in their order of
appearance in the scenario are (1) following formal routes to
General Quarters (GQ) stations, (2) verify the proper setting
of material condition Zebra, (3) ensure correct battle dress,
(4) verify proper manned and ready reports, (5) confirm proper
Zebra reports (6)/ manage Damage Control Central
administration, and (7) remove missile hazards from DC
Central. The IDCTT scenario pre-hit teaching points are
discussed below.
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• Take Formal Routes to General Quarters. The U.S. Navy
has established specific traffic patterns for personnel
when a ship goes to GQ as an effective method for
alleviating confusion and congestion. The DCA will have
the option to use the standard "up starboard forward,
down port aft" route or a different route to his GQ
station in DC Central. (Priority 7 of 7) 18
• Follow Proper Setting of Material Condition Zebra. The
DCA will have the opportunity to correct personnel
improperly setting material condition Zebra enroute to
and while in DC Central. (Priority 6 of 7
)
• Ensure Correct Battle Dress. The DCA will have the
opportunity to correct personnel in DC Central who
improperly don battle dress. (Priority 4 of 7
)
• Verify Proper Manned and Ready Reports. The DCA will
ensure all stations expeditiously report that they are
manned and ready for action. (Priority 2 of 7)
• Confirm Proper Zebra Reports. The DCA will ensure that
all stations report the proper setting of material
condition Zebra, verifying that the reports concur with
remote censors and that fittings that are known to be
open are or out of commission are properly reported by
the stations responsible for their closure. (Priority
1 of 7)
• Manage Damage Control Central Administration. The DCA
will manage the actions of DC Central, ensuring that the
information necessary for all the administrative
functions are ready for use. (Priority 3 of 7)
• Remove Missile Hazards. The DCA will ensure that all
unsecured objects are properly stowed or anchored down
to avoid becoming missile hazards. (Priority 5 of 7
)
18 Priority 7 of 7 is the lowest priority in the pre-hit
teaching points. This section is awarded a numeric priority
because the tasks for going to GQ are standardized. The post-hit
teaching points can only have relative priorities because their




Most of the IDCTT scenario concentrates on the
decisions of the DCA after the ship has been damaged. The DCA
will be forced to deal with several catastrophic situations
that require hira/her to absorb the information flowing into DC
Central and manage the damage control situation using Total
Ship Survivability (TSS) philosophies to prioritize his/her
decisions. The post-hit teaching points are discussed below
in their relative priority as determined by this research.
• Check Communication. The DCA will ensure that constant
communications are maintained between DC Central and all
reporting stations
.
• Inform Chain of Command. As a function of maintaining
communications with all reporting stations, the DCA will
ensure that the chain of command, specifically the
commanding officer in CIC and the executive officer on
the bridge, are appraised of the damage control
situation its potential ramifications.
• Restore Communications. If communications are lost for
any reason, the DCA will ensure that all measures are
taken to restore communications.
• Locate Damage. The DCA is responsible for ensuring the
lockers investigate for, locate and report all damage to
DC Central.
• Prioritize Casualties. After considering all available
information, the DCA will prioritize damage in
accordance with TSS principals.
• Coordinate Teams. The DCA will coordinate the actions
of the repair parties to facilitate combating the damage
according to its relative priority.
• Isolate Damage. The DCA will approve measures to
prevent the further spread of fire, flooding and smoke.
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• Isolate Explosive Hazards. The DCA will order the
isolation of hazardous material near a fire because they
are critical areas that require immediate attention to
prevent catastrophic secondary explosions from further
endangering the survivability of the ship.
• Restore Firemain. The DCA will monitor the firemain and
take all necessary action to restore it if there is a
degradation in the system. The firemain is the DCA's
principal tool for combating casualties.
• Restore Vital System. The DCA will take actions
necessary to restore the ship's vital mechanical
systems. TSS principals determine the relative priority
for initiating system restoration.
• Calculate Stability. The DCA will validate the accuracy
of stability calculations, and inform the command of
the actions necessary to maintain the stability of the
ship.
• Manage Damage Control Central. The DCA will manage the
actions of DC Central, ensuring that information is
being accurately gathered and passed and that all the
administrative actions are being carried out properly.
• Provide Battle Routes. When required, the DCA will
provide personnel with routes for safe passage for one
destination to another.
• Order Casualty Power. When required, the DCA will order
the rigging of casualty power. The DCA will also
determine and assign the source and destination for
casualty power.
• Manage Personnel Casualties and Evacuations. The DCA
will support the aid of personnel casualties by
coordinating information on, determining safe routes for
and managing the safe movement of all ship's personnel
casualties
.
3. DECISION EVALUATION VARIABLES
The equation for the Fuller Decision Index is shown
below. It is comprised of two critical components which
mathematically yield a maximum score of one point per
decision. The first component, which is given a weight of 40
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percent, captures the gathering and processing of information,
which constitutes the DCA's pre-decision information base.
The second component, which is given a weight of 60 percent,
captures the correctness and timeliness of a DCA's decision,
which constitutes the impact the decision had upon the
intended problem.
,
. INFORMATION . . .
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. DECISION . c . , ,
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The 40/60 split between information base and decision
outcome is a function of the relative importance of the of the
two components which, together constitute damage control
decision making. The most important consideration when
evaluating DCA performance is the outcome of each particular
decision. Positive results, which are absolutely essential
for effective damage control, receive a greater weight, even
though there are many historical examples in which the right
decisions were made for the wrong reasons. The FDI, which
assumes that better decisions are made when founded on more
accurate information, compensates for the likelihood of a
correct decision for the wrong reason by weighting the
importance of the pre-decision information at 40 percent. The
two global variables in the original formulation
("Information" and "Decision") have discrete components.
These components and their respective weights are discussed
below.
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a. Measuring the DCA's Pre-decision Information
The DCA has several sources of information in the
pilot IDCTT scenario. These sources occasionally pass
inaccurate, ambiguous, or conflicting information. The
quality of a DCA's pre-decision information base will be
inferred or "known" from recording the information the DCA
acknowledged receiving or subsequently transmitted to
interested parties during the interactive training session.
If the correct information was known, but a poor decision was
made, it is assumed that the DCA failed to properly
incorporate that information into the decision making process.
The four variables that compose "Information" and measure the
quality of the DCA's pre-decision information are listed,
weighted, and defined below.
• Information Ground Truth (I6T) = 1
The Battle Damage Estimator's (BDE) predicted weapons
effect on the ship.
• Information Available, Not Sought (IANS) =.2
Relevant or critical situation information was available
but was not known. This includes not clarifying
ambiguous or conflicting information.
• Information Known (IK) = .7
Relevant peripheral information on a particular
situation is known.
• Critical Information Known (CIK) = 1
Exact location of a casualty or specific cause of system
degradation is known.
The Information Ground Truth (IGT) variable will
always be the denominator in the information component of the
equation, using only one of the three other information
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variables as the numerator for any particular decision. The
value of the denominator will always equal one, because it
reflects the highest level of information available; that is,
"ground truth." The weightings associated with the
information variables in the numerator reflect this writer's
best determination of their relative importance with respect
to ground truth.
b. Measuring the Quality of the DCA's Decision
The IDCTT scenario is a combination of
independently initiated events that can only be successfully
resolved by the DCA's correct actions. The DCA's actions
exercise no influence or control over the independent
initiation of an IDCTT scenario situation, like a mine or
missile hit. However, all of the DCA's decisions or
indecisions will have a positive, negative, or neutral effect
on the dynamic status of ship and its systems. The six
variables that compose "Decision" and measure the quality of
the outcome resulting from each DCA decision are listed,
weighted and defined below.
• Decision Ground Truth (DGT)=1
This is the subjectively derived determination of the
best decision to successfully resolve a situation. This
variable will be used as an initial standard for
statistically determining a best objectively derived
decision in future studies.
• No Action Initiated (NAI)=0
No corrective action was taken when action was
appropriate for the given situation.
• Action Initiated (AI)=.25
A decision that caused some change in an independent
string of events initiated by the scenario, but the
decision has either neutral or negative effects because
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it does not help successfully resolve the situation.
This accounts for all of the possibilities that are not
timely, correct or partially correct.
• Correct Action Initiated (CAI)=.75
An action is initiated that has positive impact by
improving a situation. It may or may not lead to the
successful resolution of a situation.
• Action Initiated Timely (+T)=.15
The value of this variable is only added to CAI if an
action is taken in time to successfully resolve a
specific situation.
• Correct Action Initiated Timely (CAIT)=1
A correct action was initiated in the most expeditious
manner to successfully resolve a situation.
The Decision Ground Truth (DGT) variable will
always be the denominator in the decision component of the
equation, using only one of the other decision variables as
the numerator for each decision. The only exception to this
rule is when a correct decision is made in a timely manner;
earning an additional bonus of 15 percentage points. The
value of the denominator will always equal one, because it
reflects the best decision available; that is, "ground truth."
The weighting associated with the decision variables in the
numerator reflect this writer's best determination of their
relative importance with respect to ground truth. The










Figure 2 Decision variable relationship
4. FULLER DECISION INDEX SCORING
The maximum score awarded for each decision is one
point as depicted in Figure 3. Every time the DCA makes a
decision related to a teaching point, the relative quality of
that decision will be calculated by cycling through the
appropriate decision evaluation variables. The FDI will
measure the quality of information used before the DCA made a
decision as well as the outcome of the actual decision. The
sum of the two components - quality of information and outcome
of the decision - is the decision score, which when combined
with all the other decision scores creates a raw score. The
raw score divided by the total number of decisions, multiplied
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Figure 3 FDI scoring breakdown
decision score can also be analyzed in terms of the percentage
of its components by examining the overall quality of DCA
information or decision outcomes.
100 [E < ( INF0*MATI0N ) .4) +( ( DECISION ).6)/YDECISIONS]=DQ%*~^ IGT DGT ^-^
5. PREDICTED FDI FINDINGS
Recall that the IDCTT matrix of conditions, in much
the same way CAMIS does, takes a snapshot of the condition of
the ship at a specific moment, recording both the time and the
change in the ships status as a function of both independently
occurring scenario driven events and events caused by the
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DCA's decisions. The FDI will capture the information known
by the DCA during each of these situations.
Combining the sequential snapshots after each DCA
decision transforms information configured in a two
dimensional bar graph with each bar representing the DCA's
relative information base superimposed over the ground truth
status, depicted in Figure 4, into a three dimensional time
series representation of the evolution of the DCA's
information base which is superimposed over ground truth - a
surface - depicted in Figure 5. Along with providing the
simple statistics detailing the number of decisions made and
time for scenario completion, the evolving surfaces will
graphically compare the dynamic evolution of ground truth (BDE
predicted ship's status) to the DCA's known information as a
function of the outcome of each decision.
The "Beta test" phase of IDCTT will use the FDI data
to establish an expert level of performance as a benchmark for
future comparison. The FDI will only evaluate decisions
dealing with the teaching points, eliminating much of the
confusion associated with determining why one matrix condition
or surface evolved into another. Focusing the FDI on scenario
dependent teaching points also helps to objectively and
statistically prove or disprove the hypothesized assumptions




















































Figure 5. Time series summary of ground truth versus known
information
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performance of damage control experts will statistically
support the assumptions used to develop IDCTT and the FDI
.
This research derives the following hypotheses on expert
decision making performance:
• The priority of subjectively derived teaching points
will be validated by the time and frequency experts
request information. The earlier they address a
teaching point and their greater initial query frequency
will correlate to its relative importance;
• Matrix surfaces will reveal an expert path consistent
with the teaching points relative priorities;
• The amount of known information and decision quality
will be a highly correlated;
• Experts will resolve information ambiguity significantly
faster than novices;
• Expert performance will be degraded significantly less
than novices as a result of high workload.
Given that the hypotheses generated for expert
performance are true, the performance of novice DCA's will be
significantly poorer than experts. A major reason for weaker
performance in the IDCTT scenario will result from cascading
errors as a consequence of being caught in a teaching point
"pitfall." Pitfalls are the major or minor repercussions of
missing a teaching point. Major pitfalls are much more lethal
than minor pitfalls. Hypotheses on the why the novice's
performance will be weaker than expert performance are as
follows
:
• Novice's susceptibility to teaching point pitfalls will
be highly correlated to both poor information and high
workload;
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• Novice's ability to process known information will be
degraded as workload increases. Even though the
information was gathered, the decisions will still be
poor;
• Given the novice's degraded information processing
ability, they will access information on the same topic
more often and fixate on narrow swath of the problem.
This trend will have a different shape from experts
surfaces which will indicate attention on several
critical items early in the scenario. Novice fixation
will hinder the acguisition of known information on
other critical situations and will result in activation;
• Fixation will also result in significantly degraded
levels of in managing routine, lower priority events.
D . SUMMARY
IDCTT's is a research and development project that is
uniguely focused on its goal of demonstrating new training
technology to support TSS and the CNO mandated level IV ship
survivability management training. The complete integration
of fact-based scenario development, advanced programming
methodology, and insightful evaluation techniques is
innovative, logical, and programmatically sound.
The creators of the IDCTT scenario painstakingly
investigated every aspect of the target platform to ensure the
highest level of fidelity for the training. The IDCTT
programmers, using the CAMIS methodology, solved the problem
of creating realistic functional ship responses to both
scenario driven and DCA actuated events. The research for and
the development of this thesis addressed and incorporated
relevant findings from the following topical areas:
• Principles of TSS doctrine,
• Theories on stress and decision making,
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• Lessons learned from other research into decision making
and their associated programs,
• Personal damage control experience,
• The BDE and pilot IDCTT scenario, and
• The limitations and capabilities of ICW.
The analysis of these six interrelated subjects provided
a basis in fact and supposition on which the Fuller Decision
Index was developed and can be used to quantitatively justify
the impact of an IDCTT application with respect to DCA
decision making proficiency.
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IV CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The FDI's development precedes the completion of both the
IDCTT scenario and the programmed logic for the matrix of
shipboard conditions and responses. The research on which the
FDI was based is a useful source of information for the
organizations involved in IDCTT development. This research
addressed the often divisive issues and difficult tasks of
defining specific MOEs, MOPs, performance standards, and the
impact of stress on individual performance. The FDI was
designed to produce quantitative data that can be used to
evaluate the actual performance of DCAs in complex TSS
situations. The FDI data could ultimately resolve the
difficult issues of determining MOEs, MOPs, and performance
standards, which previously were simply subjectively derived.
Developing a method to resolve these issues required
exploration into the essence of damage control, the TSS
situations DCAs are expected to face, and the determination of
how DCAs must perform. The task of training individuals to
become competent DCAs has become increasing difficult because
the TSS doctrine requires that DC training be integrated
across all shipboard departments. Evaluating DCA performance,
moreover, has also become more complex. The DCA's goal is no
longer simply surviving damage, but preparing the crew to
perform tasks that restore and reconfigure vital combat
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systems needed to defend the ship against further
hostilities
.
The introduction of new ICW training technologies, like
IDCTT, will help bridge the training gap between DC
requirements and DC capabilities. The FDI, which is an
integral part of IDCTT training will, for the first time,
provide a quantitative index which measures the specific
effect each DCA decision has upon the performance of the DC
organization, and by extension, the survival of the ship.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Another analysis must be conducted with actual data to
determine the psychometric and statistical properties of the
FDI; that is, the FDI must demonstrate reliability. A second
analysis must be conducted to demonstrate that the FDI can
differentiate between levels of decision making proficiency;
that is, the FDI must be sensitive enough to reliably capture
differences between novice and expert levels of decision
making performance. If the FDI is validated, it would provide
a means to evaluate emerging training technology and determine
its pedagogical efficacy and cost effectiveness. Such a
validation would lend credence to the program, creating solid
grounds for implementation as an approved training tool for
DCAs.
ICW training significantly improves an individual's
ability to apply knowledge to difficult tasks. Despite the
obvious benefits of ICW, this thesis revealed its obvious
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shortcomings. ICW provides levels of reality and stress that
have not been experienced in damage control training before.
The level of emersion into the training, however, can be
improved using new technology. The emerging technology of
"virtual reality" can improve the fidelity of training
environments by simply increasing the level of interactively
beyond that which current configurations of ICW can support.
Research needs to extend the level of interactively and
enhance the level of emersion beyond today's ICW by applying
virtual world technology to the DCA training problem.
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